This paper illustrates how supply chain (SC) analytics could provide strategic and operational insights to inform the management of food safety and adulteration risks, and specifically risk-based deployment of regulatory resources in food SCs. The paper leverages an integrated, self-constructed and massive dataset of food product test results conducted by the China Food and Drug Administration (CDFA) across China.
Introduction
Food safety and food adulteration are global societal problems that challenge regulatory organizations, the food industry, and consumers around the world. Managing food safety risks, such as foodborne illness outbreaks, as well as intentional and economically motivated adulteration (EMA) of food products is particularly challenging because of the size, complexity and opaqueness of the food supply chains (SCs). This challenge is underscored by the relatively scarce resources allocated to regulate and inspect these SCs. For example, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is able to sample only about 1-2% of the millions of imported shipments of food products. China is another country that faces major challenges in regulating its food system and mitigating food safety and EMA risks, particularly because of extremely disaggregated and complex food SCs.
Indeed, China, like other countries, has been experiencing multiple major and public scandals of food adulteration. Perhaps the most notable case was the melamine incident, in which more than 50,000 babies were hospitalized with serious injuries and even multiple deaths, because of baby formula that was contaminated with melamine through the dairy SC in China 1 . EMA is particularly 3 challenging since it requires deep understanding of the underlying SCs and the various economic incentives that could motivate stakeholders in the SC to adulterate the food.
This paper provides a first-of-its-kind analysis to illustrate how data-driven SC analytics can enable risk-based monitoring of food SCs to allow risk-based decision making and more efficient application of scarce regulatory resources. In particular, the paper is focused on China and leverages an integrated, self-constructed database to provide both strategic and operational insights that inform risk-based sampling of food SCs in China. At a strategic level, the paper provides a detailed analysis of the SC sources that introduce detected adulterants. This leads to powerful insights as to what are the high-risk SC locations (parts) that require more regulatory attention. This is an example of risk-based sampling by SC location. Additionally, the paper provides operational insights, by leveraging historical test results to identify high-risk companies within the SC that are more likely to introduce adulterants, and therefore should be prioritized for testing. This is an example of risk-based sampling of individual companies. To the best of our knowledge, riskbased sampling of food SC in China and other countries is not well-developed, partially because of challenges to obtain, integrate and operationalize relevant SC data, as well as lack of sufficient expertise in advanced analytics. Thus, the analysis in this paper provides a first illustration of the promise of these approaches to enhance regulatory efforts to manage risks related to food safety and EMA. The hope is that the paper will stimulate additional research by academics with SC and analytics expertise, to further study the potential of SC analytics in better understanding these risks and informing regulatory operations strategy and on-the-ground activities.
Results & Contributions
The analysis in the paper relies on an extensive, self-constructed database of over 2.6 million food test results conducted by the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) throughout China between 2014-2018, currently posted in a non-standardized and mostly unstructured form on over 300 different websites (Levi et al. 2019) . The first part of the analysis is focused on the freshwater grown aquatic product SC in China. Typical to many products categories, this SC is extremely complex and disaggregated. Moreover, aquatic products are known as a high-risk food category with many incidents of adulteration (Liang et al. 2018) . In particular, China is among the largest consumers and suppliers of aquatic products worldwide. The analysis considers close to 90,000 tests conducted on aquatic products in different SC locations (e.g., retailer outlets, manufacturers, restaurants). Each failed test that detected specific adulterants, is associated with the SC source (e.g., farming, manufacturers, environment) that was most likely to introduce the detected adulterants. The association is done based on experience with prior food adulteration incidents, as well as technical and economic analysis of the underlying motivation to add the adulterants to Jin, Levi, Liang, Renegar, Springs, Zhou, Zhou: Testing at the Source: Risk-Based Sampling of Food Supply Chains
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the food, and where it would be most 'naturally' added. The result is an aggregated analysis of the sources of risk in the SC. The main insight emerging from this analysis is that the current policy of the CFDA is focused more on consumer-facing downstream SC locations, such as retailer supermarkets and restaurants, instead of primarily testing at the SC risk sources. More concretely, the analysis suggests that higher level of regulatory attention should be allocated to wholesales markets (WSMs). These large markets are unique to the China food SC, and consolidate 70-80% of the market supply of aquatic products, as well as many other important product categories (Chen et al. 2006) . The analysis suggests that the failure rates of tests conducted in WSMs are higher and that they can potentially be leveraged to create a greater level of transparency and traceability in the SC.
The second part of the analysis provides operational insights to guide resource allocation of regulatory inspection (testing) resources. Specifically, test results at downstream locations such as retail stores, are used to flag high-risk manufacturers, whose product failed because of an adulterant the manufacturer is suspected to have introduced. The underlying hypothesis is that such a failed test should trigger a test on the manufacturer's site to address the source of the problem originally detected at the downstream location. Indeed, in the database mentioned above, there are over 5,000
unique manufacturers across all product categories who were flagged as high-risk. For only about 20% of these manufacturers there was a follow up test on the manufacturer's site (not necessarily testing the same product). However, the failure rate of these follow up tests is almost three times higher than the failure rates across all 438,386 tests on manufacturer sites. This illustrates how risk-based sampling that is focused on higher-risk companies could enhance the problem detection rate with the same level of resources. Notably, the CFDA, to our knowledge, does not seem to apply such an approach at the moment, and moreover is not likely to be able to conduct such analysis because of the lack of data integration.
The underlying theme of these of the strategic and operational insights emerging from the analysis is that risk-based testing aiming at the SC source of the adulteration or food safety issue are likely to lead to substantially more efficient use of resources and higher problem detection rate. Such strategic and operational insights could have substantial impact on the way regulatory inspection resources are allocated. While the analysis in this paper is focused on China, the insights are likely to hold more generally.
Related Work
While this paper's risk-based framework and methodologies to determine adulterant risk-sources are new, the work relates to existing literature in several ways. Other researchers have used the outcomes of public food safety tests to understand the overall state of food safety risk in China, but 5 using much more limited data than what is used in this paper. Notably, (Liu et al. 2017) provide an overview of the number of food safety tests and failures by the national CFDA conducted in 2016, for different product categories, and their seasonal variance. The paper also categorizes some specific adulterants of interest. This might be the only other academic research using public CFDA data to shed light on risks and regulation of food safety. However this paper goes a step further by considering a substantially larger dataset that also includes the provincial and prefecture data (which involves integrating tens of thousands of files from hundreds of websites), and by conducting entirely different analyses with an emphasis on a SC perspective (See details regarding the data used in this paper in Section 2).
There are a number of studies on food safety risks based on incidents exposed by the media and published in the news. For example, (Liu et al. 2015) report the items causing food safety issues, in a regional analysis focused on Beijing. As another example, (Liu et al. 2016 ) identify risks of in the pork supply chain in China. While media exposure directly contributes to increasing the publics awareness of food safety, it contains insufficient information regarding the particular adulterants or their sources. In particular, this focus sheds light on acute instances of food poisoning or contamination, and misses adulterants with long-term impacts on health such as heavy metals.
Such a method also might include some distortions or censoring of the incidents by reporters.
Data
The paper relies on a self-created database of food safety tests, collected from public postings of different CFDA agencies 2 . More information about the process of creating the database can be found in (Levi et al. 2019) . The database includes all public postings from the state and provincial CFDA agencies, as well as all postings from 209 of the 334 prefecture agencies 3 . Because all CFDA agencies were mandated to publicly post all test results beginning in 2015, from the China Food Safety Laws, it is reasonable to assume that these postings are relatively comprehensive 4 .
A record of a food safety test typically includes basic information describing the test, such as
what type of food was tested, where the food sample was taken from, who manufactured it, when the test occurred, and the test outcome. In addition to features related to information directly provided, the analysis in this paper also relies on three features that were added to the data in post-processing. First, product category is only partially labeled in the original dataset, and the 6 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
product categories are from two inconsistent standards (CFDA and Guibao). The unified dataset uses a single product categorization for consistency, leveraging machine learning to predict product category labels, based on the detailed names of the food being tested (Levi et al. 2019) . Second, for failed tests, the detailed notes from the inspector describing the test outcome are used to extract which adulterants were detected using natural language processing. Third, the sample location names and addresses are used to identify the SC location in which each test took place (e.g., restaurant, supermarket). Very high accuracy rates of 97%+ are achieved for each of these three features (Levi et al. 2019 ).
Overall, the database contains 2.6 million food safety tests. Limiting to tests conducted in the 209 prefectures from which postings were collected (for which we have all prefecture, provincial and state level data), and removing tests conducted before 2014 (for which the public data was posted infrequently), leaves 1.7 million tests. This includes 89,970 tests of aquatic products.
The Food Supply Chain in China
Food SCs in China typically have complex structures, that substantially differ from most developed countries. While developed countries typically have a relatively small number of large, verticallyintegrated commercial farms, China has 200 million farms, most of which are small and familyowned. This represents 35% of the world's total number of farms (Lowder et al. 2016) . Moreover, the SCs in China have many-tiers, with food passing through multiple points before reaching the consumer. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the freshwater aquatic SC in China. It was constructed through literature review (Ren and An 2010) , and corroborated through interviews and field work.
The freshwater aquatic SC is a typical example of the complexity of food SCs in China. There are several important aspects to note from Figure 1 . The first thing to note is the centrality of large wholesale markets, which typically are absent from Western food SCs. Wholesale markets often specialize in at most a few product categories, and serve as large consolidation points of the SC. Specifically, for aquatic products as well as many other product categories, wholesale markets consolidate 70%-80% of the total market supply (Chen et al. 2006 ). This centrality is especially true of aquatic products, for which there is consumer demand in China for live products from a wide variety of species, and a huge number of small aquaculture farms, making other distribution mechanisms more difficult. In contrast to the millions of farms, manufacturers, retail outlets, and restaurants, there are only about 4,500 large wholesale markets in China that sell food, and few that specialize in aquatic products 5 . For example, in Zhejiang province, which has a population of 56 million people, there are just 38 wholesale markets that sell aquatic products 6 . The Freshwater Aquatic Supply Chain and Regulatory Agencies in China
The second thing to note is that aquatic products will often pass through as many as four SC locations, before reaching the consumer. Because various points in the SC represent separate business entities, that may want to conceal their sourcing for business reasons/competitive advantage, this often means traceability to the wholesale market and farm is difficult to impossible once food reaches the consumer.
As shown in Figure 1 , there are two main regulatory agencies that oversee most food safety testing. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MOA), and it's subsidiary the Bureau of Ocean and Marine Fisheries, are responsible for most of the testing at aquaculture farms and on boats. The CFDA, which is in the process of being absorbed into the recently formed Market Supervision Bureau, is responsible for most of the testing at SC points outside of farms and boats 7 . Unlike the CFDA, the MOA doesn't post test results in the public domain. Therefore, the focus for the paper is on evaluating the CFDA testing strategy and outcomes in our analysis.
Current CFDA Testing Strategy
The publicly-stated CFDA testing strategy, is to test broadly throughout the SC, but with a strong emphasis on consumer-facing points, such as retail stores and restaurants. Moreover, when food product test results are in violation of the regulations, the penalty (typically a fine) is levied only an incentive-based approach to regulating food safety could be less effective.
A display of the CFDA's testing allocations and failure rates, corresponding to the different SC locations in Figure 1 , is presented in Table 1 . A table of testing allocations and failure rates just for aquatic products, is presented in Table 2 . These tables are constructed from the database described in Section 2. In these tables, wholesale markets refer to very large markets, that sell large amounts of food, usually directly to other businesses. Wet markets refer to smaller markets, that sell smaller amounts of food, usually to individuals and restaurants. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 , the CFDA focuses half of its resources at retail and supermarkets, despite the failure rates being the lowest at these types of locations. The CFDA's current internal processes determine high-level testing allocation priorities across cities, product categories, and SC points 9 . For example, the central CFDA might choose to collect 100 samples of aquatic products from restaurants in Beijing, and 200 samples of aquatic products from supermarkets. These decisions are often motivated by news stories or specific adulteration incidents, and not data driven. Once these decisions are made, third-party testing companies and labs are contracted to carry out the tests, according to these high-level tasks from the CFDA, with the remaining details about which companies, specific locations, or specific products to test left at the discretion of the testing lab.
Risk-Source Analysis for Aquatic Products
The analysis presented in this section considers all the failed tests of aquatic products in the CFDA database discussed in Section 2. For most of the failed records, the inspectors typically record detailed information for why the test failed, including the detected adulterants causing the failure. The goal of this analysis is to identify for each failed test, the likely source in the SC that introduced the adulterant. For example, sorbic acid is a preservative that is sometimes introduced into dried aquatic products during the manufacturing/drying process and prior to packaging. Therefore, the manufacturer is the most likely location in which sorbic acid is added.
As another example, malachite green is an antimicrobial used to protect live and fresh fish from disease. The use of malachite green would be motivated during the farming stages, or during the circulation/transportation stages from the farm and throughout the SC until reaching the consumer. More generally, the idea is to identify the likely source based on analysis regarding where an adulterant could be added to the SC, and where there would be incentives to add it. The ultimate goal is to create aggregated analysis regarding what SC sources introduce risk into the SC.
Overall the adulterants are segregated into four primary risk sources, including farming, environmental pollution, manufacturing, and circulation, as shown in Figure 2 below. Table 4 presents the proportion of failed tests from each adulterant category, across the various SC locations introduced in Figure 1 .
Adulterant Risk-Source Dictionary

Mixed-Risk Sources
While most of the adulterants included in Table 3 are associated with a unique source, there are two categories of adulterants which could have come from more than one SC source. Specifically, certain heavy metals could be introduced from either environmental pollution or manufacturing, and certain antimicrobials could be introduced during either farming or circulation. For the analysis, we developed a methodology to narrow the estimates of the amount of risk that could be attributed to different possible sources.
Heavy Metals. For aquatic products, the source of certain heavy metals could be either environmental pollution or manufacturing processes. However for fresh aquatic products in particular, which are unprocessed, the source must be environmental pollution. For the CFDA database from Section 2, records were determined to relate to fresh aquatic products, based on whether the product descriptions include only the name of the fish or shellfish along with a weight of the product. Records that include words like 'dried' or 'salted' were excluded from being labeled as fresh aquatic products, as these words indicate processing.
Antimicrobials. For antimicrobials, the CFDA performs mass spectrometry tests on both the combined amount of the chemical and its metabolites. For instance, when testing malachite green, Table 5 presents the results of the analysis, based on the SC locations introduced in Figure 1 , the four types of risk sources introduced in Figure 2 , and the adulterant dictionary introduced in Table 3 . The ranges in Table 5 are computed as follows. Each row corresponds to the respective SC location (e.g., restaurants, wholesale markets), and considers all failed aquatic products tests conducted in that location. For each failed test, the risk source is determined based on Table 3 , and the methodology described in Section 5.2. If the source is not uniquely assigned, then a minimum and maximum probability of each risk source being responsible for introducing the adulterant are calculated. For example, if a test failed because of nitrofurans, then from Assumption 1, the probability range is 62.3%-97.5% that farming was the risk source, and the probability range 2.5%-37.7% is that circulation was the risk source. Aggregating these ranges across all failed tests, Table   5 presents the ranges of the overall risk from each risk source. The results in Table 5 suggest that most of the adulterant risk is likely being introduced by farming and manufacturing practices. This stands in contrast to Tables 1 and 2 , that indicate that most of the CFDA tests are conducted at downstream, consumer-facing locations, such as retail stores. As a result, testing policies which can directly identify risky farms and manufacturers should be very useful to regulators. This is also supported by the recent work of (Gao et al. 2019 ).
Results
Strategic Insights
The results presented in Section 5.3 suggest that farming and manufacturing practices are the primary risk sources, at least when it comes to aquatic products. Thus, a risk-based sampling approach would attempt to allocate more resources to the corresponding SC locations. However, the fact that there are millions of small and dispersed farms and manufacturers, and very little transparency in the SC, raises some significant challenges to implementing such an approach.
One approach to address the risk originated from farms in a more manageable manner is to allocate more resources to tests in WSMs. This approach is supported by the following facts:
1. Consolidation points -Wholesale markets are consolidation points, with over 70% of agricultural products being sold through them, and are very large in size. In particular, most of the aquatic farming output is sold through WSMs. Table 5 shows that about half of the risk observed in wholesale markets is due to farming practices. Similarly, more than half of the risk identified at wet markets, which are primarily supplied by WSMs and local farms, is due to farming practices.
Risk from farms
3. High failure-rates - Table 1 indicates that WSMs and wet markets have the highest failure rates of aquatic product tests.
4. Traceability -Wholesale markets provide the highest degree of traceability to the farms.
While there is heterogeneity among this traceability between markets, and still room to improve, most wholesale markets have at least some traceability requirements (Ma 2015) .
Operational Risk-Based Sampling of Manufacturers
This section illustrates how data from historical test results, and SC analysis regarding the likely source of the detected adulterants, could be used to operationally guide risk-based sampling of individual companies. In particular, the analysis is focused on manufacturers. When a processed product is tested, the CFDA inspector is also asked to report some of the information from the packaging as well, including the manufacturer name. As a result, information from failed tests of processed food products throughout the SC, including locations such as supermarkets and restaurants, can be used to flag manufacturers as high-risk, in scenarios when the detected adulterants were likely by the manufacturers. The idea is that such a flag should trigger a test on the manufacturer premises to address potential problems at the source. This idea is presented in Figure   3 .
The subsequent analysis includes all product categories. The goal is to assess the potential value of risk-based sampling of manufacturers. To complete the analysis, the adulterant dictionary from Table 3 is extended to all product types. Across all product types there were 285 unique reasons for failed tests in the CFDA database, 182 of which are likely to be attributable to manufacturing. These can be split into 13 adulterant categories, which are displayed in Table 6 , along with examples.
Based on these adulterants, the analysis created 11,246 high-risk flags for 5,402 unique manufacturers, triggered by tests in downstream locations. Following the scenario described in Figure 3 , these manufacturers are assessed to be introducing adulterants into the SC. Of these 5,402 unique manufacturers, only 1,112 were tested on-site within six months of the date of the downstream test creating the first high-risk flag. Overall, there were 1,522 tests conducted on these 1,112 manufacturers sites (counting all tests on the first day these these manufacturers were sampled following
Step 3 -High-risk manufacturers are tested onsite
Step 2 -Manufacturers flagged as high-risk, based on failed downstream tests
Step 1 -Risk is introduced by manufacturers This corresponds to a failure rate of 9.86%, compared to 3.86% for on-site manufacturer tests in general. Additionally, of the 11,246 high-risk flags created, 3,482 or about 31% were because of a test outside of the manufacturer's province. Because of the dispersed regulatory structure of the CFDA and the lack of data sharing across different CFDA organizations, the CFDA is not likely to be able to integrate this breadth of data at the moment. This illustrates the enormous benefit that could result from better data-sharing across provinces in the future.
To show statistical significance of the result, an exact binomial test is performed on seeing 150 or more failures in these 1,522 tests, given that the failure rate was the same as that for manufacturers in general, or x = 0.0386. We have a p-value of p < 1 × 10 −6 :
P(At Least 150 Failures
An overview of the data included in the operational tool is given in Figure 4 , and a map of the high-risk manufacturers is shown in Figure 5 . 
Concluding Comments
This paper highlights how SC analytics can provide several important strategic and operational insights regarding how the CFDA could improve the allocation of testing resources in food SCs throughout China. The common theme is that risk-based strategies that seek to test at the SC risk sources are likely to be more effective. Specifically, the paper suggests that allocating more testing resources to WSMs and other upstream location is likely to be more effective than the current CFDA approach that emphasizes testing in downstream, consumer-facing SC locations. In addition, the paper illustrates how analytics based on historical test records can be leveraged to identify specific high-risk manufacturers who introduce risk into the SC.
One possible concern regarding the paper is the quality of the data it uses. Specifically, the paper relies on publicly available data that is self-reported by the different CFDA branches and levels.
This raises the potential concern that data might not be complete or consistently reported across a b c most of the tests are published. Moreover, these biases are sufficiently random so that they should not fundamentally alter the insights highlighted by the paper, at least not directionally 13 .
The paper stimulates many important questions for further research. For example, it would be interesting to study to what extent testing food in different locations of the SC differs in terms of the ability to identify problems, create transparency as to where the risks are being introduced, as well as the costs involved. Such analysis would inform more refined optimization of the related resource allocation. Another interesting set of questions relates to studying and modeling of the adulteration mechanisms and their incentives, which can in turn lead to identification of additional measurable risk drivers that can be incorporated into risk analytics models and further inform risk-based regulatory strategies.
Finally, while the work in this paper is focused on China, the concept of risk-based regulatory resource allocation is common to almost all developing and developed countries. Thus, the paper strives to serve as a first step towards developing a new and needed body of work on risk-based analytics-enabled regulatory strategies to address the global risks of food safety and food adulteration.
